Introduction
Among the most remarkable changes in Western societies over the last decades have been the structural changes in employment caused by globalization (Goos et al., 2009; Goos and Manning, 2007; Autor et al., 2006) . The international integration of product and labor markets has affected the composition of industries and increased demand for workers in more-complex occupations. For example, Spitz-Oener (2006: p. 263 ) finds that "occupations have experienced a shift towards analytical and interactive activities and away from cognitive and manual routine tasks" over the past decades. This implies that the structural change in employment is particularly detrimental to low-skilled workers and advantageous for highly skilled workers, as less-complex tasks are increasingly relocated to countries in the East (Goos et al., 2009; Goos and Manning, 2007) . This continuing economic change requires a flexible and suitably skilled workforce, which necessitates investments in education and training.
This study examines the poorly understood impact of public subsidies for further training of employed low-skilled workers. I focus on unravelling the causal effects of government subsidies on cumulative earnings and employment outcomes exploiting substantial exoge nous variation in award intensity, which I call the conditional policy style, at the regional level among unemployment agencies that provide these subsidies in Germany. I thereby contribute to a literature that has, so far, seen little quantitative analysis. The bulk of the literature is concerned with subsidized training programs for unemployed workers (for an overview, see Card et al., 2010 Card et al., , 2015 and mostly concludes that training for the unem ployed yields positive gains in the long run.
In contrast, the literature on the returns of training subsidies for employed workers is rela tively scarce. Existing studies focus on heterogeneous programs using differing methods and data and, therefore, report mixed results. Abramovsky et al. (2011) and Görlitz (2010) look at the firm-level outcomes of government subsidies for further training for low-skilled employed workers. While Abramovsky et al. (2011) do not find effects of UK subsidies for low-skilled training on firm or training take-up rates, Görlitz (2010) finds positive effects, ranging from 10 to 15 percent, for the share of firms investing in training through German firm vouchers partially covering direct training costs. By contrast, providing additional in formation about these vouchers to German workers does not increase training take-up at the worker level (Görlitz and Tamm, 2016a) , and there is no significant impact on wages for low-skilled workers (Görlitz and Tamm, 2016b) . Consistently, Hidalgo et al. (2014) do not find wage effects of training vouchers for low-skilled workers in the Netherlands. By contrast, Stenberg (2011) shows that an additional year of adult education in Sweden in creases annual earnings by 4.4 percent. However, these programs differ from the subsidy program evaluated here because they are not directly linked to on-the-job training. The paper by Dauth and Toomet (2016) , which analyzes the impact of subsidized training on the employment duration of workers older than 45 years in small and medium-sized firms, is the most similar to this study. They find improved employment among participants of the subsidy program, which they attribute to the postponement of retirement due to increased job satisfaction. IAB-Discussion Paper 07/2017 This study contributes to the literature by using high-quality register data to evaluate the effects of a government subsidy program that provides further training for low-skilled em ployed workers in Germany. By exploiting exogenous regional variation in the treatment probabilities, as in similar studies by, e.g., Frölich and Lechner (2010) or , I can address problems of selectivity, i.e., workers selecting into the program based on un observable characteristics, and identify causal effects. As I am particularly interested in heterogeneous treatment effects, I focus on the treatment effects of workers in subgroups, thereby taking into account evidence of disparate effects of further training by age or gender (Grund and Martin, 2012) . Several robustness checks confirm the validity of the results.
Variation in the conditional policy styles of local employment agencies affects the imple mentation of training subsidies for low-skilled employed workers. Policy styles vary across agencies due to differences in their organizational structures, problem-solving mecha nisms, and concepts (for a detailed discussion, see . While this affects the propensity to be treated, i.e., participation in the subsidy program, pol icy styles are exogenous to the employment durations and wages of low-skilled employed workers. Employed workers generally have no contact whatsoever with employment agen cies. Therefore, the assumption that region-corrected policy styles influence workers' labor market outcomes only via the underlying subsidy program is very credible.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the institutional background. Section 3 describes the theoretical considerations and Section 4 the empirical approach. Section 5 characterizes the data, and Section 6 provides the treatment effects on the employment and earnings of compliers. Section 7 analyzes the costs and benefits of the program, and Section 8 concludes.
The German labor market and the training subsidy program
Germany has experienced striking structural changes in its workforce. Following other OECD countries, which fund training through loans, subsidy programs or tax deductions (Bassanini et al., 2007) , the German government introduced further training subsidies for employed workers in 2007, supplementing existing programs for unemployed workers.
These subsidies are intended to encourage low-skilled workers, who show disproportion ately low interest in further training, to participate and to raise employers' (particularly small and medium-sized firms) propensity to further train their low-skilled personnel.
To this day, this subsidy program is the only German Federal Employment Agency (FEA) program that targets employed workers. The major responsibilities of the FEA are the re integration of unemployed workers and the distribution of unemployment benefits. Thus, in contrast to other FEA programs, which are directed at unemployed workers, the sub sidy program considered in this study is unique. Although another federal training voucher program (Bildungsprämie) has been implemented by local educational centers (see, for ex ample, Görlitz and Tamm, 2016b; Görlitz, 2010) , that program provides off-the-job training.
By contrast, the FEA subsidy program concerns on-the-job training. The FEA operated 176 local employment agencies-which own certain competencies in the active labor mar ket policy (ALMP) mix-during the relevant 2007-2010 study period.
During this period, workers entered the program primarily via their employers, although there was no explicit implementation approach. Commonly, caseworkers promoted the program to firms, which then identified potential participants who met with caseworkers at the local employment office. With the firm's support, workers could then receive a training voucher for either a training course offered by a private provider or occupational re-training.
These courses are typically offered by private providers, which must be certified by the local employment agency.
The program is primarily targeted at low-skilled workers.
1 Potential participants are con sidered low-skilled if they lack a vocational qualification or worked in a helper job, which did not require a qualification, for at least four years. Further eligibility criteria are that the employer releases the employee from work to participate in training and continues wage payments during this absence. Subsidized training courses must focus on general rather than firm-specific learning, as the objective is to improve knowledge that is applicable in the general labor market. A subsidized training course is supposed to terminate with the receipt of a certificate.
Once these criteria are met, the worker-employer dyad qualifies for two different types of subsidies: first, the FEA may cover up to 100 percent of the training costs. Second, employers may receive wage subsidies to compensate for the workers' reduced productivity during training. If training takes place outside the firm, these wage subsidies may cover up to 100 percent of the full wage. If training takes place inside the firm, the employer is expected to share these costs. The FEA covers up to 50 percent of the wage because firm-specific elements of training are more likely. Table 1 shows the inflows into the program by year and kind of subsidy. Compared to other German ALMP programs, the number of subsidy recipients is rather low (Büttner et al., 2015) . Because awareness of such subsidies was low during the introductory phase, there were few entries. The number of participants increased with the advertising efforts of employment agencies, the introduction of external training counselors, and the expansion of the program to workers just leaving unemployment. Enrollment peaked in 2009 with the financial and economic crisis in Germany. The program costs displayed in Table 1 reflect this development. An inspection of the program's monetary allocations by the German Federal Court of Auditors (Bundesrechnungshof, 2009 ) revealed an abrupt reduction of inflows in 2010, as local employment agencies were instructed to apply the eligibility criteria more strictly and to accurately document the allocation of subsidies.
The program also targets the employees of small and medium-sized firms (Dauth and Toomet, 2016) .
Theoretical considerations
The training literature offers several reasons for legitimate interventions in further training activities by official institutions (for a summary, see Booth and Bryan, 2005) . According to conventional human capital theory, investments in general human capital should be fully covered by the workers themselves (Becker, 1964) . If these costs are directly subtracted from earnings, workers experience an upward-sloping wage profile over time because they receive lower wages with their reduced productivity during training and subsequent wage increases based on their increased productivity. If such a wage reduction is not possible, e.g., due to minimum wage regulations, workers will underinvest in general training (Leu ven, 2005) . In a situation of liquidity constraints, employers can lend workers money by paying wages above productivity during training and below productivity afterwards. How ever, this scenario probably only applies when firms are able to bind workers until the loan is repaid. Thus, if such a contract cannot be enforced, there is underinvestment in training.
In the case of firm-specific further training, neither firms nor workers have incentives to invest in training because long-term contracting cannot be enforced (hold-up), and the labor market equilibrium of further training is inefficient unless firms and workers agree to share the costs and benefits (Garibaldi, 2006) .
In the new training literature, labor markets are no longer assumed to be perfectly competi tive due to an oligopolistic market structure. In the light of the associated compressed wage distribution, firms invest in general human capital, as productivity increases at a faster rate than wages after training (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999a,b) . The model implies that wages will be below workers' marginal productivity. From society's perspective, this yields under provision of training. Thus, there is evidence that privately provided investments in further training is insufficient.
A large and growing body of literature has investigated the determinants of (privately funded) further training (for an overview, see Brunello et al., 2007) . Both employers and employ ees determine training participation by weighing the costs and benefits of such training.
For employers, the benefits include increased productivity, enhanced worker commitment to the organization, and reduced labor turnover, while the costs may include direct costs or continued wage payments for workers in training. For employees, the benefits can be expressed as higher wages after training and higher chances of promotion, while the costs include reduced wage payments during training or additional working time. As a consequence, trained workers are usually younger, male, better-educated, and employed full-time. The training firms are relatively large. By contrast, low-skilled workers participate in further training less often because they cannot easily handle training costs (Albert et al., 2010; Bassanini et al., 2007; Fouarge et al., 2013; Grund and Martin, 2012; Leuven and Oosterbeek, 1999) . Public interventions, such as further training subsidies, might therefore alter the training decisions on both the employer and the employee sides by reducing the marginal costs of further training.
The literature indicates that compared to the returns of an additional year of schooling, the returns to further training are comparably large (for overviews, see Brunello et al., 2007; Haelermans and Borghans, 2012) . In a meta-study, Haelermans and Borghans (2012) es timate that the average return to a training course is approximate three percent. Regarding the expected effects of the programs on earnings, one can expect a constant or increasing wage profile over time. Initially, employers have no need to decrease wages during subsi dized training, as wage subsidies compensate them for workers' lower productivity. After training, productivity increases, yielding higher wages. Regarding employment duration, there are two opposing forces: on the one hand, employment duration increases due to workers' higher productivity and commitment to the firm. On the other hand, employment duration decreases, because employers face lower training costs that are amortized over a shorter period.
Empirical approach 4.1 The LATE framework
In this study, I consider participants entering the subsidy program between January 2007
and December 2010 and follow them over a period of up to five years. Exploiting regional variation in the conditional award intensity of training subsidies as an exogenous instru ment, I apply a fuzzy regression discontinuity design (RDD) and estimate the effect of compliers' program participation on cumulative earnings and employment duration (see also, Angrist and Pischke, 2009 ). To identify the causal effect of the subsidy on the out come, the preferred model to be estimated is
where T itq is a dummy that indicates subsidy recipience, X itq controls for individual charac teristics, and F f t for employer characteristics. A at denotes the labor market characteristics, including the composition of the population and the workforce, which allow correction for regional, structural, and economic differences. i indicates observations on the individual level, f on the firm level, and a on the agency district level; q indicates observations by quar ter and t by year. There remain η iq = itq γ + ν i unobservable variables, such as M itq , M f which might indicate workers' ambitions for which I cannot control. The effect of M itq influ ences both the outcome Y itq and the treatment indicator T itq , such that E(T itq η itq ) = 0. In order to estimate the causal effect of T itq on Y itq , I need an instrument for subsidy program participation. To instrument treatment, I construct the following variable
i LS iat for every German local employment agency district a per quarter q in year t. SLS iatq denotes the low-skilled employees who start subsidized training in each quarter and agency district, LS iat indicates all low-skilled employees per agency district and year, and Award intensity atq corresponds to the unconditional local award intensity by quarter and agency district.
Differences in employment agencies' award intensities are partially driven by regional con ditions, which are likely to impact both an individual's probability of participating in the subsidy program and participants' labor market outcomes. Therefore, I only exploit the remaining variation in the probability of treatment between different agency districts after purging variation in award intensity from region-, establishment-, and individual-level con founders. I refer to this residual variation as the conditional policy style. Figure 1 displays the corresponding variation of these average residual award intensities across German employment agency districts. Even after controlling for regional and other conditions, there are clear differences in the award intensities across local employment offices. The implementation of the instrumental variable (IV) is accomplished by using two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation. In the first stage, I regress the treatment indicator T itq , which takes the value 1 if a worker participates in the subsidy program in a certain quarter, on the instrument Award intensity atq and control variables X itq , F f t , and A at
where β 1 captures the effect of conditional policy style on the treatment probability, which corresponds to residual Award intensity atq after controlling for potential confounders.
Substituting Equation (3) into Equation (1) in the second step yields a regression of the outcome of choice Y itq on the predicted treatment probability Tî tq and the same set of control variables as in the first stage
Thus, Tî tq from Equation (3) is, by construction, initially correlated with regional and other characteristics, but once included in the second-stage Equation (4), the additional controls purge Tî tq from this correlation.
The resulting coefficient γ 1 reports the local average treatment effect (LATE) of participa tion for all compliers.
2 When interpreting the results, it should be kept in mind that the effect I estimate for compliers is different from the usually obtained average treatment effect on the treated (ATET), which is the combined effect for always-takers and compliers.
Instrumenting with conditional policy styles
Regional variation in employment offices' policy styles has been exploited to evaluate ALMP instruments in recent studies (Boockmann et al., 2014; Dean et al., 2015; Eppel, 2016; Frölich and Lechner, 2010; Lechner et al., 2013; Markussen and Roed, 2014) . In this study, agency-specific policy styles reflect the part of the implemen tation of subsidized further training for employed low-skilled workers that is solely due to local employment agencies' unique features, which are independent from structural or eco nomic specifics. Knodt (1998) 
LATE assumptions
Conditional policy styles are positively correlated with the probability of participating in the program but are not directly connected to participants' employment or earnings. Thus, the 2 One can distinguish among four different groups in the LATE framework: Always-takers participate in the program irrespective of the policy style. Compliers participate only in agency districts that are conditionally more prone to grant further training subsidies. Never-takers never participate, whereas defiers participate only in districts less prone to grant subsidies. The monotonicity assumption (see Section 4.3) excludes the existence of defiers.
instrument purges the treatment effects of confounders that might simultaneously affect both the individual outcomes and the probability of subsidization. However, the quality of the instrument hinges on several important conditions. First, to avoid the problem of weak instruments, the instrument should have sufficient ex planatory power. I will show in Section 6 that this assumption is fully met.
Second, the instrument (conditional policy styles) must be independent of unobservable confounding factors on the agency, establishment, and worker levels. Such a correlation might arise if the instrument attracts certain workers or firms or if certain workers or firms drive the instrument. The former scenario can be excluded, as it is unlikely that workers or firms relocate to regions with specific policy styles (which are likely unknown to them). consider one random draw of control workers who do not participate in the subsidy program during the observation period. This restriction is relaxed in Section 6.5.
Independent variables
In general, when evaluating an ALMP instrument, unobservable selection is a potential problem, i.e., one cannot control for all confounders that impact individual participation. Presumably, there are at least three different sources of potential selection: regions, firms (establishments), and workers. 3 The allocation of the subsidy program is probably corre lated with a number of these confounding variables. Besides these observable factors, varying distributions of unobservable factors might im pact local subsidy allocation. Unobserved worker characteristics, such as motivation, might drive award intensity. Moreover, it is possible that firms encourage ambitious workers, whom they want to keep, to participate, which in turn drives award intensity. By contrast, subsidies might also be a means of providing training for workers whom firms plan to lay off, e.g., due to economic difficulties. Following the suggestion of Caliendo et al. (2014) for propensity score matching, personality traits such as motivation-which increase a worker's value to the firm-should be captured by including variables into the regression that reflect the employment career and tenure.
Worker level

Firm level
As a worker's program participation involves the employer, it is important to account for po tential selection bias due to the employer. As mentioned above, the subsidy program was initially unknown to eligible firms and employees. Caseworkers with the employer service of local employment agencies promoted the program-in particular, to firms in industries re porting skill shortages-using a database that contains the addresses of all establishments within an employment agency district.
Thus, establishments that make use of the subsidy program might differ from other firms, particularly in terms of firm size, industry code, workforce, and economic situation. For example, larger firms have HR departments that might regularly collect information about existing subsidies. It is also easier for large firms to continue to function while workers are at training. Moreover, in some industries, such as the IT sector, human capital depreciates more quickly than in others, making further training necessary. In other industries, e.g., in the geriatric care sector, the marginal returns to training are particularly large (Dauth and Lang, 2017) , making training more attractive. Furthermore, firms facing economic difficulties might increasingly demand public support.
Accounting for the distribution of firms in terms of industry, size, worker composition, and economic situation-which is reflected in the growth of the workforce-should sufficiently purge the treatment probability and establishment policy style confounders. Table A .4.2 shows that participating individuals tend to be employed in larger establishments with work forces characterized by higher shares of older and low-skilled people. Moreover, there are differences with respect to the industry. Firms in transportation, production, and economic services are more likely to use the subsidy.
Regional level
Another crucial factor is implementation at the employment agency level. Structural dif ferences in unemployment rates and local economic situations determine the size of the agencies' staff and their general strategies. Thus, I account for the distribution of the em ployed population and the overall population of districts. I find that participants work in less densely populated regions with slightly lower unemployment rates. Moreover, I consider the distribution of the population regarding age and of firms and workforces across em ployment agencies. However, there are few economic differences, as Table A .4.3 shows.
After controlling for all of these factors, I am confident that the remaining differences in the allocation of the subsidy program depend on the local agencies' strategies and prefer ences and are unrelated to the economic situation of the region. These policy styles are exogenous to individual labor market outcomes but impact the treatment propensity and can therefore be used to instrument for program participation. Notes T: treated, C: potential comparisons 6 Results
Outcome variables
The baseline model
This section discusses the results of the econometric analysis. The first column of Table   4 shows the most parsimonious specification, controlling only for quarter dummies that ac count for the timing of treatment and regional characteristics. 5 The latter include the district unemployment rate-in order to roughly control for regional labor market characteristics In column (2), I include firm characteristics, because factors such as firm size, workforce composition, and industry are important determinants of average employment duration and of firms' further training investments. Thus, these variables potentially affect both the treat ment probability and the outcome. As a consequence of including these characteristics, the positive effect decreases significantly. Finally, I add control variables for individual characteristics, in particular, socio-demographic controls and variables that reflect both the employment career and any unobservable personal traits, as suggested by Caliendo et al. (2014) in a similar setup. The effect on employment decreases to three weeks more em ployment over two years for compliers.
The lower panel suggests that the first stage remains highly significant. Model (3) is the preferred or benchmark specification in the following analysis, as it contains the most im portant control variables. For this model, I also report the results of a corresponding OLS regression in column (4). Comparing the coefficients of (3) and (4) shows that the OLS regression generates a significant positive effect of approximately one more month of em ployment for participants over a two-year period, which is probably an overestimate of the true effect.
Additional labor market outcomes
The previous section has shown that participation in the subsidy program affects employ ment liable for social security contributions two years after treatment. Table 5 summarizes the results for the baseline specification. The effect on employment is steadily increasing over time to approximately 28 more days of employment for treated workers. The training period has a median duration of 73 days.
Thus, employment effects that persist long beyond the end of training duration do not re sult from a lock-in effect. A second outcome considered in column (2) The difference in these effects can be attributed to the compositional differences of partic ipating workers, as Table A This shift in the composition of the participating workforce can be explained by changes in legislation: during the introductory phase of the program, implementation was ambiguous to caseworkers, for example, it was unclear which courses were fundable. Moreover, in Notes: Outcome variables as in Table 5 . All regressions include the same set of control variables as in Table A .4.4).
The economic and financial crisis, which started in September 2008, induced firms to hoard labor, e.g., by further training workers (Möller, 2010) . Thus, assuming decreasing returns to training and skills, compositional differences over time explain the larger program effects in the introductory phase and the smaller effects later on.
Results by individual characteristics
In the next step, I conduct subgroup analyses, pooling data for all cohorts from 2007 to 2010. This yields a sufficiently large sample of participants. I include interactions with quarter and year dummies to control for the timing of the (counterfactual) treatment start.
I consider the same outcome variables as in the previous section. Again, the first-stage values and F-test statistics confirm the high quality of the instrument in most cases.
Looking at the effects on employment and earnings by gender (Figure 3 ), I find significantly higher returns to training on employment for women working full-time (+62 days) than for men working full-time (+22 days). This is even more pronounced in terms of earnings, with complying women earning approximately 19 percent more (men: no effect). This is likely attributable to different distributions of women and men across sectors of the economy. Table A .4.4 shows that women are concentrated in professions in health care, management and organization, and humanities and arts, while men are concentrated in manufacturing, construction, and transportation and logistics. In these sectors, women receive training courses that are, on average, 60 percent longer, which probably impart deeper knowledge.
In contrast to the previous estimates, for women, the 2SLS coefficients are larger than the OLS coefficients. This suggests that compared to men, participating women reflect the negative selection of all women. The IV specification can better control for this selection.
Furthermore, this suggests that complying women, who participate due to an excessive local policy style, profit more than females who are always-takers. Thus, drawing more women into the program might increase its efficiency. Men Women
2SLS OLS Year
Source: IEB V11.00 -131009. Own calculations. Notes: Outcome variables as in Table 5 . All regressions include the same set of control variables as in Separating the program effect by age group (Figure 4) shows that the youngest partici pants, aged 20 to 30 years, profit the most and that the treatment effect declines with age.
Thus, the marginal returns to training for compliers are particularly high at the beginning of the employment career due to a lower initial level of knowledge, lower opportunity costs, and better cognitive skills. Figure 5 shows that the LATEs on employment do not differ significantly between work ers with German citizenship and workers without German citizenship. Regarding earnings, non-Germans benefit more than Germans in the long run. In the three years after treat ment, complying participants receive earnings that are approximately 11 percent higher earnings than those of other workers. Given that the marginal returns are decreasing in the I conduct additional subgroup analyses; however, they do not provide further insights. There are no differ ences in terms of the degree conferred at the end of a training course ( Figure A Compared to Table 5 , the LATE estimates in Table 6 are generally larger, but the overall effects nearly identical. This suggests that the applied regional controls sufficiently purge the instrument of economic and structural components. Table A .4.6 supports this conclu sion. The instrument remains stable with the subsequent addition of regional controls. This confirms that the remaining local confounding variation in the baseline model, which might drive unobserved selection into treatment, is irrelevant. Table 4 . Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the level of 176 local employment agency districts. Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Benchmark estimates
As previously mentioned, the extent to which the difference between LATE and OLS is due to the selection bias of OLS or the compliers' characteristics is unclear. Assuming that the remaining selection bias can substantially be reduced by applying propensity score match ing, which controls for observable unobserved heterogeneity, I can determine whether the effects for compliers differ from those for all participants by comparing the matching co efficients and the LATE coefficients of Table 5 . The ATET obtained with propensity score matching, combines the program effects for compliers and always-takers. The propensity score regressions are based on nearest-neighbor matching with 25 neighbors and include the same set of control variables as the previous estimations.
The matching results are presented in Table 7 . They are larger than those obtained with OLS or 2SLS. The average participant is employed for approximately 55 more days and earns 15 percent more than non-participants within three years. As the LATEs are smaller, this implies that always-participants profit more from the subsidy program than compliers.
Thus, further extending the program might be costly for the FEA, as additional workers who would receive the subsidies gain less than those already receiving the subsidy. Table 5 . The propensity score regressions are based on nearest-neighbor matching with 25 neighbors and include the same set of control variables as in Table 4 . Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
6.5 The dynamics of treatment 6.5.1 Tenure and the probability to be treated
In the literature on the evaluation of ALMPs for unemployed workers, the timing of partici pation during the unemployment spell matters (Fredriksson and Johansson, 2008; Sianesi, 2004) . Thus, researchers often apply dynamic approaches to account for the correlation between the probability to be treated and unemployment duration.
Adapting timing in my setting, I examine whether treatment differs by tenure, i.e., for new hires versus long-serving workers. Tenure is measured at the beginning of the quarter of potential treatment. Thus, I assign negative tenure to workers starting employment that quarter. Figure 6 shows that all existing effects cancel out. All the effects are non-significant and do not reveal a meaningful pattern. I conduct further in-depth analyses that account more specifically for the particular setting of the subsidy program and the ambiguous role of tenure. As outlined earlier, the program analyzed in this study was introduced on January 1, 2007. Theoretically, one can distin guish between two types of workers: On the one hand, there are workers who are already employed in January 2007 for whom the risk of treatment starts with the introduction of the program. I call these workers "incumbents". On the other hand, there are workers who begin employment after that date for whom the risk of treatment starts with employment in a given firm. I call these workers "entrants". Thus, unlike a dynamic setting in which workers enter unemployment and start an ALMP program during that unemployment spell, there is no direct link between employment duration and the probability of being treated (Fredriksson and Johansson, 2008) .
Distinguishing between incumbents and entrants, I repeat the analyses for tenure. 7 Figure   7 shows that tenure is not a driving factor for incumbents, 93 percent of whom had been employed for at least two years. Only seven percent of incumbents were included in the first two tenure categories. I find significant differences (Figure 7 ) for entrants whose overall tenure is, by construction, lower (Table A. 4.5). The employment effects are largest (+135 days) for entrants who had worked for at least two years at the beginning of the quarter of potential treatment, but there are no effects on earnings. I find significant earnings effects only for entrants employed from 184 to 730 days at the beginning of a quarter, i.e., workers who had passed the probationary period but who are still within the two-year period when temporary contracts can legally be concluded. Thus, training seems most financially beneficial for compliers who are still temporarily employed, giving them the opportunity to distinguish themselves from other workers.
The results for negative tenure durations are, by construction, only based on observations of entrants. Therefore, Figure 7 does not explicitly depict them again. Table 5 . All regressions include the same set of control variables as in 
IAB-Discussion
Dynamic treatment effects
Having observed some heterogeneous effects by tenure, I test whether accounting for the dynamics of treatment alters the overall results in the next step (Table 8) Comparing the dynamic estimates of Table 8 with the static ones of Table 5 reveals that regarding employment, the dynamic estimates are slightly larger for both incumbents and entrants. Thus, all approaches yield very similar results; however, the static approach provides more conservative estimates. Regarding earnings, the static approach generates an earnings effect of six percent. In the dynamic framework, I find an earnings effect of 8 percent in the three years after treatment for incumbents. I find an effect of +5 percent for entrants, but these coefficients are statistically insignificant. Thus, on the one hand, the results of the static framework might be slightly overstated for entrants. On the other hand, the dynamic effects might be attenuated because training is more efficient for workers who participate later in their employment spell. This is supported by the previous findings that program efficiency varies with tenure and is particularly high for workers who have been employed between 0.5 and 2 years. Source: IEB V11.00 -131009. Own calculations. Notes: All outcome variables are calculated over 365 days (1st year), 730 days (2nd year), and 1095 days (3rd year) after the first of the quarter of the potential treatment start. Outcome employment comprises cumulated days in employment liable to social security contributions. Earnings is the average of daily cumulated wages. All regressions include the same set of control variables as in Table 4 . The first-stage regressions include the same set of control variables as the corresponding second-stage regressions. Standard errors in parentheses are bootstrapped (50 repetitions) and clustered at the level of 176 local employment agency districts. Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
7 Cost-benefit considerations On the benefit side, I assume that workers receive the same average daily wage of ap proximately 74 euros as during the three years before participation (Table 9 , Panel C).
Multiplying these daily wages by the estimated LATE on earnings from Table 5 (Table 9 , Panel B, last Line) and daily per capita benefits (Table 9 , Panel C, last Line) over a two-year period, on average, the program does not seem to pay off. However, this differs by year such that for 2007 and 2008 benefits might actually exceed costs. Moreover, assuming that the positive effect on earnings is perma nent and persists beyond two years, e.g., five or ten years, the subsidy program could be beneficial.
From the fiscal point of view, it is important to include additional tax revenues. In order to pay off, the program should pay for the daily average cost of 6.67 euros. As the additional daily earnings are lower than that in most years, it is impossible that additional tax revenues approach those costs, except for 2007 and 2008. Overall, the numbers suggests that in budgetary terms, the program might not pay off for the government, at least over a two-year period.
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It is difficult to judge the adequacy of these estimates. Further gains in employment or earnings beyond a two-year horizon imply an improvement of the results. Moreover, from the social perspective, one has to add potential gains to employers and public gains through reduced benefit transfers. However, I have information on neither the administrative costs of employing caseworkers to implement the subsidy program nor the cost of the drop in firm productivity during the training period.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have analyzed the impact of further training subsidies targeted at low-skilled employed workers between 2007 and 2010. Thereby, I contribute to the scarce literature on the effects of subsidized further training for low-skilled employed workers rather than unem ployed workers. For identification, I rely on an IV approach, exploiting conditional regional variation in the intensity of subsidy awards by local employment agencies. This conditional intensity is exogenous to the labor market outcomes of employed workers, hence enabling me to predict program participation and to obtain LATEs.
The evidence suggests that the subsidy improved the labor market outcomes (employment and earnings) of subsidy recipients. For compliers, I find positive effects of 28 more days of employment, an increase in earnings by 6.2 percent, and no effect on the receipt of unemployment benefits over a period of three years. Given that Haelermans and Borghans (2012) report an average return to privately funded training of 3.5 percent, these estimates are nearly twice as large as those reported in the literature. The effect on cumulative employment is negligible in economic terms. However, there is substantial heterogeneity across groups of compliers. In particular, workers starting program participation in 2007 profit more in terms of employment and earnings than do later cohorts. This is related to a compositional change in the participants, which was triggered by the economic crisis and adjustments in FEA regulations. As a consequence, low-skilled workers who entered the program later had more favorable characteristics and therefore gained relatively little from the subsidy program. Further beneficiaries of the program include women, younger workers, and non-Germans. Complementing the analysis with several robustness checks, I conduct additional dynamic estimations in the spirit of dynamic matching approaches (Fredriksson and Johansson, 2008; Sianesi, 2004) . The resulting estimates support the robustness of the previous findings.
From a political perspective, the results of this study suggest that targeting females, younger workers, and non-Germans might increase the subsidy program's efficiency. In fact, recent adjustments by the FEA emphasize these groups (training in the female-dominated occu pation of elderly care and focusing on younger workers since April 2012. Currently, drawing refugees into the program is being carefully considered. In this sense, my study provides ex post justification for these adjustments.
The program has the potential to improve the labor market chances of low-skilled workers who usually face high unemployment risk, particularly for long-term unemployment (Bun desagentur für Arbeit, 2015) . Thus, complementing programs for unemployed low-skilled workers, this subsidy program may efficiently prevent unemployment among low-skilled rather than stepping in when the damage is already done. Thus, saved benefit trans fers and potential positive spillover effects on coworkers (De Griep and Sauermann, 2012) should also be taken into account should data that allow for deeper cost-benefit analysis become available.
Evaluations of training subsidies for employed workers exist for the German training pre mium (Bildungsprämie), which subsidizes general training courses for employees in the form of vouchers, as well as for programs in Sweden (Schwerdt et al., 2012) , and the Netherlands (Hidalgo et al., 2014) . In contrast to these studies, which do not find any sig nificant effects on employment and earnings, I find positive returns to training. This might be related to differences in the type of training, as training is a rather general term. More over, these programs have no direct link to participants' jobs, and these newly acquired skills might be less applicable to that job.
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